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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
CRIINAL LAW-DEADLY WEAPON DOCTRINE
The inference of intent to kill or to do serious bodily harm
which is drawn from the use of a deadly weapon is dne of the
types of inferred malice which developed in the early common
law. Such writers as Hale,1 Blackstone,' and East3 give the classi-
cal examples of its application in the past.' Many of the* early
decisions were cases of excessive punishment where the provoca-
tion was not sufficient to justify the use of a deadly weapon. For
instance, a master corrected his servant with an iron bar; in one
case, a mother, and in another, a schoolmaster, killed a child by
stamping on his abdomen; and a park-keeper tied a boy who was
found stealing wood, to a horse's tail and struck the horse so that
the boy was dragged away by it
It should be pointed out that one does not have to intend to
kill in order to be guilty of murder at common law; an intent
to inflict grievous bodily harm is sufficient. Perkins suggests that
this should be kept in mind in applying the deadly weapon rule
because it permits convictions under an inference of intent to
inflict serious bodily harm where an inference of intent to kill
might not be possible.'
Why is such an inference of intent drawn from the use of a
deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm? The best rationalization would seem to be that every one
knows that some weapons, such as loaded guns, and certain other
instruments, such as stones, when used in a dangerous manner,
are likely to produce death. Therefore when one directs such an
instrument at another person, he may naturally expect that his
conduct will produce death or serious bodily harm. In such cases
it would seem that it is reasonable to infer that the killing was in
fact intentional, and the actor should be guilty of murder in the
absence of justification or excuse.
The fact that the doctrine is generally applied only in cases
where there is an absence of direct proof of malice raises several
difficult problems. The defendant may say, for example, that he
used the weapon in self-defense, and his only chance is that the
'I HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1778) 454, 457.
2 IV BL. COMM. (11th ed. 1790) 199.
3 EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1806) 234, 235.
'Grey's Case, J. Kelyng 64, 84 Eng. Rep. 1084 (1666).
'IV BL. COMM. (11th ed. 1790) 199.
STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1877) 161.
'Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43
YALE L. J. 537, 554.
'For the rationalization offered by many courts see: People v.
Crenshaw, 298 Ill. 412, 417, 131 N. E. 576, 578 (1921); Common-
wealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 306 (Mass. 1850); Commonwealth
v. York, 9 Metc. 93, 103 (Mass. 1845).
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jury will believe his story An innocent man, placed in this
unfortunate situation by the inference of malice, might be con-
victed and receive the death penalty for a crime which in fact he
did not commit. It is to be expected, of course, that many defend-
ants will make false statements in an attempt to escape punish-
ment. This group will probably constitute the great majority, but
if there is a strong likelihood that a substantial number of innocent
persons will be affected adversely to the point of injustice by the
rule, it should be restricted in its application. Should it appear
that such is the case, the adoption of the negligent murder doctrine
in cases involving a deadly weapon is a possibility. The use of
the deadly weapon would then be one of the circumstances to be
considered and would raise no inference of malice. This would
provide a greater safeguard for the rights of the defendant and
might still allow the prosecution a conviction for murder where
the man is actually guilty, although under a different rule and
with a lesser degree of punishment under most modern statutes.
Having dealt with the reasoning behind the rule, we may
inquire into the effect which the law gives to this inference. The
best view seems to be that a rebuttable inference of the fact of
malice is set up.1" It is considered that the rights of the defendant
are not excessively endangered, for he may rebut the inference
by any defenses or evidence which he is able to offer. And, on
the other hand, the state is aided greatly from the procedural
standpoint in that, having presented evidence to prove the killing
with a deadly weapon, it may rest and allow the defendant to
present his case. The net result of the application of the doctrine
is that the state may show a killing with a deadly weapon; and
that showing alone, without mitigating circumstances, will be suffi-
cient to sustain an indictment and a conviction for murder.
Now it may be asked, what is a deadly weapon? In Acres v.
United States it was defined as "a thing with which death can be
easily and readily produced."'  And, as we have seen, the require-
ment of deadliness is also met if great or serious bodily injury is
likely to result. In applying these definitions, the following cate-
gories provide an adequate coverage for all situations. A deadly
weapon may mean (1) a weapon or instrumentality deadly per se,
or (2) one not inherently dangerous but which is used in a deadly
manner. Under the first category will be included such weapons
'This very thing occurred and the jury rejected the defend-
ant's plea of self-defense and convicted him of murder. Durr v.
State, 175 Miss. 797, 168 So. 65 (1936).
'The term inference should be used instead of presumption,
since the latter denotes a rule of evidence and goes further in its
scope than the former. IX WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) sec.
2491; Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43
YALE L. J. 537, 550.1 164 U. S. 388, 391, 41 L. Ed. 481, 484 (1896).
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as loaded guns and pistols' and long knives.3 Instruments which
have been classified as deadly because of the manner of their use
under the circumstances include automobiles," bricks,' hands and
feet,' pen knives," canes,' pistols used as bludgeons," stones,'
chisels,', pins (used on a baby),-' chairs,' policemen's maces," iron
bars,' and axes.' The circumstances may include the strength of
the actor and of the victim as well as the nature and size of the
instrument itself.=
The determination of what is a deadly weapon may be made
by the court, the jury, or by both. A Kentucky case defines the
province of court and jury by saying:
"The established rule on the subject is that, where the
weapon is of such character as to admit of but one conclusion
in that respect, the question whether or not it is deadly is one
of law; but where the weapon employed is such that its deadly
character depends upon the manner and circumstances of its
use, the question is one of fact for the jury."'
Many courts have ruled on the issue in cases in which it is con-
clusive that the weapon is deadly or in which it is practicable for
them to do so." It is significant to note that the question is gen-
erally decided as a matter of law where the weapon used is deadly
per se, and that the jury decides whether the instrument was deadly
under the circumstances. In addition to these distinctions, there
is still a third aspect to the determination of what is a deadly weapon.
The issue may be a mixed one, partly of law and partly of fact.
In such cases, the jury will render a verdict after an instruction has
been given by the court stating the elements of a deadly weapon
'Landreth v. State, 201 Ind. 691, 171 N. E. 192 (1930); Ewing
v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 237, 111 S. W. 352 (1908); McBride v.
State, 121 Tex. Crim. Rep. 288, 51 S. W. 2d 385 (1932).
"Jones v. State, 74 Tex.cCrim. Rep. 205, 167 S. W. 1110 (1914).
'People v. Clink, 216 Ill. App. 357 (1920). Contra: People v.
Cash, 326 Ill. 104, 157 N. E. 76 (1927).
'State v. Lee, 6 W. W. Harr. 11, 171 Atl. 195 (Del. 1933); State
v. Sims, 80 Miss. 381, 31 So. 907 (1902).
"State v. Smith, 196 Wash. 534, 83 P. 2d 749 (1938).
'State v. Roan, 122 Iowa 136, 97 N. W. 997 (1904).
n Collins v. State, 22 Okla. Crim. Rep. 203, 210 Pac. 285 (1922).
"Prior v. State, 41 Ga. 155 (1870); Shadle v. State, 34 Tex. 572
(1870-1871).
"Acres v. United States, 164 U. S. 388, 41 L. Ed. 481 (1896).
"Commonwealth v. Branham, 69 Ky. (8 Bush) 387 (1871).
"State v. Norwood, 115 N. C. 789, 20 S. E. 712 (1894).
"Kouns v. State, 3 Tex. Crim. App. 13 (1877).
'Doering v. State, 49 Ind. 56, 1 Am. Crim. Rep. 60 (1874).
"People v. Lee, 23 Cal. App. 2d 168, 72 P. 2d 572 (1937).
"Dollarhide v. United States,..1 Morris 233, 39 Am. Dec. 460
(Iowa 1843); State v. Walker, 193 N. C. 489, 137 S. E. 429 (1927).
Cosby v. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 221, 72 S. W. 1089 (1903).
Owens v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 207, 210, 218 S. W. 719, 720
(1920).
"See State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407, 413 (1879).
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and leaving to the jury the task of finding whether the accused is
guilty under the particular circumstances of the ease'
In conclusion, it is submitted that the inference of malice from
the use of a deadly weapon is desirable and that the application of
the rule should be continued. Although it may work an injustice
in a few cases, it is believed that these instances will be rare, and
that, all things considered, its merits outweigh these possibilities of
injustice.
E. DURWARD WELDON
'An instruction which the Kentucky courts have used is found
in STANLEY, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN KENTUCKY (1940) sec. 810.
